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THE IMPACT OF FIXED USURY CEILINGS
ON MORTGAGE LEN DING:
FURTHER EVIDENCE
Richard T. Cherry, Larry W. Spradley
and Lois Jenkins

There has been an accumula lion of evidence over the past
decade suggesting that mor tgage usury ceilings imposed by states
a re largely ine ffective at achieving the purpose for which they were
designed: helping prospective home owners obtain mortgage c redit
at "reasona ble" rates. Instead, research suggests that mortgage
usury ceilings that conflict with free market rates reduce the level of
single family home construction [8, 10], decrease the volume of mortgage lending [3,6], and trigger the imposition of noninterest loan
terms that increase the effective cost of credit to the borrower
and/or reduce the lender's risk to a satisfactory level in view of the
yield attainable [5.6].
The available evidence, however. remains tentative. beset by
problems of scope, measurement and methodology. and - at points conflicting.
The purpose of this paper is to report the results of additional
empirical testing of the impact of fixed mortgage usury ceilings on
the availability, cost, and terms of mortgage credit.
Previous Research
A 1974 study by Phillip Robins [9] used data from 77 SMSA's
during the "credit crunch" year 1970 to measure the effect of usury
ceilings on new, single-family housing starts. Robins found that housing starts in usury-impacted areas were about 28 percent below
those in SMSA's not so impacted. Yandle and Proctor [12] in a 1978
study focused on the 1970 and 1974 "credit crunch" years. Using
one SMSA from each of the fifty states and the District of Columbia.
they concluded that building permit activity was adversely affected
as interest rates approached the usury ceiling.
The first empirical work on the effect of usury ceilings on the
mortgage market per se was apparently the 1976 study by James
Oas las [6]. Using quarterly data for the period 1965 through 1970
from 15 la rge SMSA's, Oastas used linear regression to measure the
rela tionship between the pressure exerted against usury ceilings by
the open marke t rate a nd each of four independent variables: (1) the
volume of mortgage lending as proxied by building permits, (2) the
fees and points imposed by lenders on new mortgage loans. (3) the
percentage down payment required, and (4) the average ma tur ity of
new loans made. With the exception of loan ma turity, a ll regression
coefficients ha d the theoretically expected sign a nd were significa nt
at the .05 level.

A 1979 study by James McNulty [3] examined the impac t of state
usury ceilings in th_e state_o~ Georgia on new, si~gle-family housing
starts and on le nding activity. He found a stallstically significant
relations hip between mortgage lending and the spread be tween the
free marke t ra te and the usury ceiling. Contrary to ea rlier studies,
however, he found no relationship between building permits and the
spread va ria ble.
None of the work cited has measured directly a nd unambiguously the effect of usury ceilings on the dollar volume of mortgage lending. Oastas used building permits as a proxy for mortgage
lending, while McNulty's results are tainted by the inclusion of
usury-constrained SMSA ·s in his sample of areas used to estimate
the free market rate of interest on residential mortgage loans. In addition, the use of building permits or housing starts as a p roxy for
mortgage lending activity omits the impact of mortgage loans for the
purchase of existing residential structures.
Some additional ambiguity arises from the use of constraints on
the measure of "pressure" exerted by the usury ceiling. This
pressure has generally been handled in one of two ways: (1) the
studies limit the observations tested to those where the free market
rate of interest exceeded the usury ceiling (12], or (2) lhe values of
the observe lions were constrained to reflect an o priori assumption
that ceilings do not impact mortgage lending when the free market
rate is below the usury ceiling by some amount selected by the investigator [3. 6, 9]. Robins. for example, found that usury ceilings affected mortgage lending activity when the free market rate was
within 100 basis points below the usury ceiling. The structure of his
model, though, hampered pursuit of the issue. and he defined an
area as usury constrained if the ceiling was less than 100 basis
points above the free market rate.
The analysis that follows will examine the relationship between
the Texas mortgage usury ceiling and the dollar volume of mortgage
lending for both new and existing residential structures. Further.
the analysis uses an uncontrained spread variable as well as testing
the impact on mortgage lending when the spread variable is constrained to various ranges.
The Model
The model assumes the existence of sufficient competitive conditions in major urban mortgage marke ts for rates in each market to
remain close to national average mortgage rates over time [2. 4]. It is
assumed. furth e r. that in any one market. there exists a range of
mortgage interest rates reflecting the c harac teristics of the borrower a nd of the mortgaged prope rty [1].
Given these assumptions, it would be expected that as free
market rates on mortgage loans approach the usury ceiling in a
usury constrained market, some marginal loan applicants would be
rationed out of the market. a nd overa ll mortgage lending in that
market would decline. We would ex pec t. furthe r, that lende rs would
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tilize noninterest loan terms (including discount points, down pay~ent requirements , and loan maturities) in a way to achieve a
satisfactory risk-yield "package" on the loans made.
Specifically, the model is designed to test the proposition that as
free market rates approach the usury ceiling in a constrained
market:
1)

the dollar volume of mortgage lending
declines;
the discount points charged borrowers
increase:
the loan-to-value ratio on new loans declines;
and,
the average maturity of new mortgage loans
declines.

2)
3)
4)

These propositions are summarized in equations (1) through (4)
below:
(1)
L = to + f1 (ru - re)
p
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+
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(4)

dollar volume of new loans closed;
discount points imposed on the borrower;
loan-to-value ratio of mortgage loans closed:
the average maturity of mortgage loans closed:
the maximum legal contract rate of interest on
mortgage loans in the usury constrained area:
and.

the free market yield on mortgage loans in areas
unconstrained by usury limits.
The expression (ru - re) is the spread variable. measured as the
difference between the usury ceiling and the a verage yield on single
family residential mortgage loans in areas unaffected by usury ceilings. The spread va riable serves as a measure of the pressure exerted against the usury ceiling as free market rates approach the
ceiling. The larger the s pread variable. the weaker the pressure
against the usury ceiling. The "spread" narrows as the open market
ra te approaches the ceiling, a nd the spread variable becomes
negative when the free market ra te exceeds the usury ceiling.
3
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Equation (1) states that there is a direct relationship between
the spread va r iable and the volume of new residential mortgage len.
ding, i.e., as the free market rate approaches the usury limit (the
spre_ad narr~ws), the ?~liar ~olume of residential mortgage lending
declines. This propos1t10n simply expresses the profit maximizing
behavior of mortgage lenders who are unwilling to commit funds at
rates less than the equilibrium rate for the level of risk perceived.
Equa lion (2) posits an inverse rela lions hip between the spread
variable and the number of discount points imposed on new mortgage loans, i.e .. a s the spread narrows, marginal borrowers are ac.
commodated by the imposition of points which increase the effective
yeild on the loan over the contract ra te.
Equation (3) states that the loan-to-value ratio of new mortgage
loans is direc tly rela led to the spread variable, i.e., as the spread
narrows, lenders tend to impose higher down payment requirements. Equation (4) states that there is a direct relationship
between the spread va riable and the maturity of new loans made,
i.e., lenders tend to reduce the average maturity of new mortgage
loans as the free ma rket rate approaches the usury ceiling. Both of
these propositions may be understood as attempts by mortgage
lenders to achieve equilibrium yields by reducing the risk on new
loans to a level appropriate for the yield attainable.

The Data
The dollar volume of loans made a re s tate of Texas totals for
mortgage loans made by savings and loan associations on both new
and existing 1 - 4 family residential structures.1 Noninlerest loan
terms a re those associated with conventiona l first mortgage loans
made by savings a nd loan associations of new and existing singlefamily residential properties.
The test period covers 38 quarters, beginning with the first
quarter of 1970 and ending with the second quarter of 1979. 2 During this period, Texas was subject lo a 10 percent ceiling on conventional mortgage loans.
The dollar volume of loans closed is from the Monthly Statistical
Series for the Ninth District. Federal Home Loan Bank of Little Rock.
Data for noninteresl loan terms a re from the Federal Home Loan
Bank Board's Mortgage Interest Rote Survey, and are based on pooled observations from the Dallas-Fort Worth SMSA and the HoustonGalveston SCSA. The Federal Home Loan Ba nk Board furnishes data
on these two areas as representative of s tale-wide noninterest loan
terms. The use of pooled data from the two areas was acceptable
based on covariance tes ts of the s lopes of the two series.
The free ma rke t [equilibrium) rate of interes t on conventional
residential mortgage loans in areas uncons trained by us ury ceilings,
re, was estimated as the unweighted average of mortga ge rates in
four SMSA's whose usury limits we re 12 percent or higher for the
period studied. The four areas were: Boston-Lawrence-Lowell SCSA.
4

Detroit-Ann Arbor SCSA. Denver-Boulder SMSA, and SeattleTacoma SCSA.
Regression Methodology and Results
Mortgage loan data were subjected to a polynomial smoothing
process. A logarithmic trend line was fitted to the smoothed data.
and seasonal adjustment factors were computed by the ratio-tomoving average method. The raw data were then adjusted for trend
and seasonality . The other three series displayed no significant
trend or seasonality, and were used unadjusted.
Each of the four series was then subjected to linear. leastsquares regression analysis against the spread variable. The results
of the four first-stage regressions are summarized in Table 1.
The dollar volume of mortgage lending and points and fees imposed on new mortgage loans showed regression coefficients significant at the .05 level and displayed the expected sign on the regression coefficient. Both the loan-to-value ratio and average maturity.
however, showed unexpected negative signs on the regression coefficients. The regression coefficient for average loan maturity was
significant at the .05 level. but the "t" statistic for the loan-to-value
ratio was not large enough to reject the null hypothesis Iha I the
regression coefficient was zero.
The Durbin-We tson statistic for all four regressions suggested
the presence of systematic disturbances in the error terms.
A plot of the loan residuals showed a clear. linear trend. indicating that the original log trend adjustment had not removed all
of the time-related trend from the data. A least-squares trend line
was fitted to the residuals. and the loan data were adjusted for the
additional trend. Loans. adjusted in this manner. were regressed
against the spread variable yielding:
L

= .587 + .0051 (ru - re).

R2

= .801

(5.4721}
D.W.

= 1.6186

The regression coefficient is significant a I the .05 level. and
changes in the spread variable were able to explain about 80 percent of the movement in loan volume. The value of the DurbinWatson statistic allows us to accept the null hypothesis of serial independence of the error terms. and the Goldfeldt-Quandt test [7. pp.
104-105] yields no suggestion of hetero- scedasticity.
The residuals of the other three equa lions displayed no s uch
clearly-defined pattern. and the equallons were subiected to a
transformation of the form:
(Y t "i°Yt-1), (Xt--Pxt-1 1

where,,O ~

1 - D.W.
2

[11 , pp.94-95].

TABLE I

FIRST STAGE REGRESSION RESULTS

Equation No.
(1)

Dependent

Independent
Variable

Intercept

=

L

.703

+

.00416(ru •re)'
(4.917)

R2 = .653

(2)

D.W. = .8595

= 194.32 · .276(ru •re)'

p

(4,083)
R2 = ·.346

(3)

=

UV

D.W. = .7349

81.2 - .0031 1(ru -re)
(1,167)

R2 = -.035

(4)

D.W. = .2120

= 29.25 - .0108(ru · re)'

M

(3,053)
R2 = -.237

Notes: "t" statistics are in parentheses.
*Significant at the .05 level.
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D.W. = .1 436

The regression results, using the transforma lions. a re summarized in Table II. Note that the "quasi-differencing" process is
able to eliminate autoregressive disturbances in the error terms, but
only equa lion (2) remains significant al the .05 level.
Discussion

The regression results are consistent with propositions (1) and
(2): that the dollar volume of residential mortgage lending declines
and lenders impose higher fees and discount points on new loans as
the free market rate of interest approaches the usury ceiling.
One might argue, of course. that the correlation between constraint pressure and loan volume is spurious: that the decline in
mortgage lending simply reflects a decline in demand for mortgage
credit as the cost of such credit increases. This argument has been
dealt with elsewhere on a theoretical basis (6, p. 824],3 Empirically,
Robins [9] has shown that loan volume declines relative to that in unconstrained areas as free market rates approach the ceiling rate in
a usury constrained market.
As a further test, the spread variable was constrained within
va rious ranges and regressed against mortgage lending with the
results shown in Table III.
When the free market rate is 200 basis points or more below the
ceiling, there is no significant relationship between interest rate
changes and loan volume. The relationship 1s significant at the .05
level between 100 and 200 basis points below the ceiling, however,
and the relationship strengthens as free market rates move within
100 basis points of the ceiling. While these effects might be explainable in terms of changing demand elasticities, the weight of the
evidence certainly points toward reduced willingness to lend.
The tests show no significant relationship between down payment required or loan maturity and the spread variable. Oastas. it
will be recalled, found a significant relationship between loan-tovalue ratio and constraint pressure.
Over the period studied, loan-to-value ratios and average loan
maturities in Texas have, in fa ct, increased, albeit not in any
systematic way with changes in constraint pressure. The explanation seems to lie instead in the sharp rise m the cost of new homes.
Rising home costs have made it necessary for lenders generally to
reduce down payments and lengthen maturities in order lo reduce
the purchaser's monthly payments and avoid pricing some home
buyers out of the market.
Disintermediation, as measured by the net change in savings
deposits for each quarter, was unable to explain any of the variation
in loan volume on either a coincidental or a one-quarter lagged
basis. The coefficients of determina tion were -0.020 and -0.034,
respectively, and neither regression was significant at the .05 level.
Conclusions and Policy Implications

The Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control
Act of 1980 preempted sta te usury laws on residential mortgage
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TABLE II
REGRESSION RESULTS USING
"QUASI-DIFFERENCED" VARIABLES

Dependent
Variable

Equation No.

(2)

p

=
R2

(3)

M

24.47

Independent
Variable

.31

(Xt f)X1.1)

1.240

D.W .

= 1.4607

- .00521(Xt }Xt-1)
(0.723)

= -.016

D.W . = 1.7365

= .058

· .0026(Xt -)lXt-1)
(0.649)

R2 = -.013

D.W. = 1.6811

Notes: " l" s tatistics are in parentheses
* significant al the .05 level.
The Goldfeldl - Quandt lest yields no suggestion of
heleroscedaslicily in equa lion (2).
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0

(3.191)

= ·.236
=

UV
R2

(4)

Intercept

TABLE Ill
REGRESSION RES ULTS MORTGAGE
LOANS VS. SPREAD VARIA BLE

Regression Equation

Constrained
Spread Variable
All Values

(ru -re)

L

=

R2

= .801

L

200

R2

200>(ru -re)

100

L
R2

(ru · re)<100

L

=

.587

(5.4721)

.688

o.w.

= 1.6186

+ .0049(ru -re)
(0.8596)

= .082
=

+ .0051(ru -rel*

776

= 480

o.w.

= 2.0376

+ 0032(ru -re)·
(2. 1959)
O.W

= 2.1466

= .668 + .0046(ru -re)*
(3.5538)

R2

= .790

D W. = 1.7757

Notes: "t" s tatistics are in parentheses.
* significant a t the .05 level.
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loans until April 1, 1983, unless overriden by state laws. Thus 80
forty-six s tates that had mortgage usury ceilings of one l~e me
another will now have to consider whether to pass new legislation~r
0
reestablish those ceilings.
The findings of this study support the proposition that fixed
us~ry ceilings red~ce ~e flow of funds into residential mortgages.
Usmg data on residential mortgage lending by savings and loan
associa lions in Texas over the period 1970 through the second
quarter of 1979, results show that a fixed usury ceiling acts to constrict the flow of mortgage funds when the free market rate moves to
within 200 basis points of the ceiling and that the effect becomes
stronger within 100 basis points of the ceiling.
The results indicate, further. that lenders increase the fees and
discount points imposed on new loans as the free market rate of in.
terest approaches the usury ceiling, thus increasing the effective
cost of mortgage funds. There is no indication that lenders, during
the period studied, used down payment requirements or loan maturity to adjust risk as constraint pressure increased.
The policy implications seem clear. Evidence continues to accumulate that fixed usury ceilings simply do not work if their pur,
pose is to assure the availability of mortage credit at "reasonable"
rates, where "reasonable" is understood to mean some statutory
rate less than the rate that would prevail in an unhampered market.
Some rationale might be found for mortgage usury limits in
rural areas where competition is limited or nonexistent. Even in
these cases, however, a fixed usury ceiling is probably too inflexible. A provision linking rates in rural areas to competitive rates in
major urban mortgage markets would protect prospective borrowers from unfair administered rates in areas where competition
is meffective.
Results suggest, too, that any usury ceiling should be specified
in terms of effective rates rather than contract rates to avoid circumvention of the ceiling by the imposition of points and fees.
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NOTES

lThe FHLB Little Rock Monthly Statistical Series did not report
single family and 2 - 4 family residential mortgages separately until
January 1976. For the period reported. 2 - 4 family residential structures were an insignificant part of the total 1 - 4 family loan volume.
2Texas converted to a floating usury ceiling in August 1979.
3See also the references cited there.
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